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GOLD, ISLAM AND CAMELS:
The Transformative Effects of Trade and Ideology
ALICE WILLARD
Introduction
One of the most nagging questions in world-systems theory, once
you have accepted that precapitalist world-systems are possible, is
simply how did they function? While scholars have reached some
consensus as to how the capitalist world-system has developed and
changed over time, there is still little consensus regarding
precapitalist systems. To a large extent this is caused by the
multiple disciplines involved in the research: the vocabulary of
political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians and
archaeologists may overlap in terminology, but fragments over
meanings. The present work is an effort to synthesize the historical
record for one particular state in West Africa, in order to examine
the underlying social structures in a precapitalist world-system.
The Sudannic Empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai stretched over
most of West Africa at their height, extending from Mauritania in
the north southward to Niger, Mali and Guinea-Conakry. The time
frame extended from their origin in the second half of the ninth
century, to the 1591 conquest of Songhai by Moroccan troops. The
analysis has three major parts: state formation, the process of trade,
and the expansion and development of Islam.
Within the general objective of this paper two theoretical
questions will be considered. The first concerns an ongoing debate
between David Wilkinson (see especially Wilkinson, 1991a), and
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1991a) regarding the
nature of different types of systems, the conceptualization of core,
peripheral and semiperipheral regions within world-systems, and the
method of spatially bounding intersocietal systems. It might be
useful here to provide a brief overview of the similarities and
differences in their positions regarding these three points before
proceeding with the Songhai case study, especially as this clarification will provide the definitions for the terms used in the analysis.
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Wilkinson (1991a) defined a world-system as "... militarily
closed, geotechnologically isolated social-transactional networks
with an autonomous political history" (Wilkinson, 1991a p. 113).
In a later paper, Wilkinson also defined civilization "as politicosocial transaction networks of cities and their populations"
(Wilkinson, 1991b, p. 3), rather than using the more traditional
definition of cultural homogeneity. Civilizations and world-systems
were used in his writing thereafter either interchangeably or as a
compound noun.
In this way, the possibility of a core,
semiperiphery and periphery could be analyzed as part of trade or
military networks, without requiring geographic (or state) borders.
Civilizations contained a core, which is usually an urban area and
its surrounding territory.
Civilizations also included a
semiperiphery and periphery, which Wilkinson defined through the
expansionary logic of politico-military control. Semiperipheries
were areas recently overwhelmed, and peripheries are those that
were known but not yet beaten (Wilkinson, 1991a, pp. 121-2). The
world-system was therefore bounded by regular military interactions, and areas connected by long distance trade were distinct and
termed 'oikumenes.' His focus was on the political and military
orders for defining both world-system and civilization, rather than
the economic one, and this concentration requires the existence of
states.
Chase-Dunn and Hall instead defined a world-system as "...
intersocietal networks in which the interaction (trade, warfare,
intermarriage, etc.) is an important condition of the reproduction of
the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affects
changes which occur in these local structures" (Chase-Dunn and
Hall, 1991a, p. 7). Their definition of a world-system is more
eclectic as it could contain pre-state systems in which trade was
more important. Their definition of a world-system could also
contain core/periphery relations, although not necessarily. Where
these existed, one important condition of the world-system was the
types of interactions between the core and the periphery, which
might be either hierarchical or differentiated.
Hierarchical
interactions implied economic exploitation or political domination,
while differentiation did not. While the most common form of
exploitation would be of the periphery by the core, this was not
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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only possibility incorporated into their definition. Trade, in
particular, is not necessarily exploitative, but this type of relation
must be examined on a case by case basis, as their definition
posited a more complex model than Wilkinson's. The argument of
Chase-Dunn and Hall examined the complexity of the interactions,
and the specifics of the relations (economic, military, et al.) for the
different types of interactions. These intersocietal networks are
nested within each other, as illustrated in Figure One, and the
world-system must be analyzed as a function of all these different
types of linkages. Figure One shows the first network of trade in
bulk goods, the second as the sphere of politico-military control,
and the third as trade in prestige goods.
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Both Chase-Dunn and Hall and Wilkinson define world-systems
in terms of interaction networks, but the major distinction between
them was their emphasis on the relative importance of different
kinds of interactions. Chase-Dunn and Hall have allowed the
possibility of different types of cores (and, presumably, different
types of peripheries) in a manner that Wilkinson's definition would
reject.
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There were three major interactions in Chase-Dunn and Hall's
boundaries: 1) trade in bulk goods, 2) politico-military relations,
and 3) trade in prestige goods. Wilkinson omitted the trade in
prestige goods as part of the world-system, and instead bounded the
world-system by its politico-military interactions.1
One of the advantages with the nestedness of different types of
interaction networks was as an analytical tool: it could make
identifying the role of core, semiperiphery, and periphery somewhat
easier at a given point in time, and allows for the possibility of
those identifications changing over time. Using the interaction
networks as a way to bound the components of a world-system
might also illustrate the fall-off effect. This effect occurred when
there might have been contact between systems, but where that
contact was not sufficiently significant to shape events: the price of
West African gold was neither necessary nor sufficient to matter to,
for example, China.
The second question concerns the place of religion in a worldsystem: ideas have always accompanied the more physical aspects
of intersocietal relations, but how these ideas might affect other
types of interaction, and reshape system boundaries, have been
largely ignored by both Wilkinson and Chase-Dunn and Hall.
Understanding the influence of Islam as a political and ideological
force2 is critical to understanding the nature of West African
civilization (using Wilkinson's definition), that of the larger trade
networks over the northern half of Africa, as well as the even larger
prestige and ideological linkages with Asia and Europe.
Data Concerns.
Before launching into the detailed analysis of the Sudannic
Empires, it might be useful to describe briefly some of the specific
problems with the available data. There were three major areas of
concern: the availability of the sources, synthesizing data from
disparate disciplines, and language obstructions.
Records contemporary with the Mali and Songhai Empires were
from two disparate groups of sources. The first group was
medieval, written Arabic travel accounts by individuals who might
or might not have actually seen all of the places they described.
The persistent confusion regarding the direction of the Niger's flow
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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was a case in point. The second group was a modern one, using
the extensive local oral tradition. Both of these were useful
separately, but they were more useful in conjunction with each
other as a crosscheck, which could compensate for the different
biases in each of the sources. For example, a bard recounting the
Epic of Son-Jara today would produce a work similar in many
respects to its fifteenth century version, but it would also incorporate five hundred years of minor changes that would make it
different from the original. These minor changes would have come
about due to shifts in the bard's training, as well as specific
historical alterations in the Epic: the context in which bards created
these epics was very different from the modern context.
Current information involved a creative use of skills in order to
combat the diffusion biases of both the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries: briefly put, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the French colonial sources implied that Arabic culture,
diffused southward, created the Sudannic Empires. After independence, many written sources implied precisely the reverse, so the
data must be weighed on their own merits and through the filter of
the writer. Another problem involved the shift in disciplinary
focus. Most 'African history' dated either from the colonial period
or with independence, making it one of the newest area foci in
history. West African archaeology was even newer, and research
into historical sites was perhaps the newest branch, as much of the
prior effort was on examining Neolithic settlements, spurred on by
the Paleolithic research in East and southern Africa. The various
bits of the mosaic are still being found and cleaned, which makes
reassembling them into a coherent picture as speculative as Arthur
Evans' reconstruction of Knossos. The current work was based
primarily on the historical sources.
The final problem was one of language. Many of the epics in the
oral traditions were translated into Arabic from Mande or Soninke,
and then retranslated into French or English. This led to problems
in translation such as Ibn Khaldun translating 'Mansa Uli' as Sultan
Ali, when the original Mande for uli meant red or fair-complexioned (Ki-Zerbo, p. 6). Also the Malinke languages have not been
static: meanings in the fifteenth century might not be the same in
the twentieth, even if the bard relating the epic was trained in the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1993
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same tradition. The context had shifted, which affected even more
modern translations directly from Mande. A similar problem
occurred with the written sources, which are in medieval and
possibly idiosyncratic Arabic, which had been translated and
retranslated into modern Arabic usage as well as modern French.
Names posed a particular problem in this regard, as the spelling
conventions for Arabic were extremely varied. The French terms
were equally varied. When the terms were then translated and/or
anglicized, there were further spelling changes and often different
meanings resulted.
It was important to keep the linguistic and historical biases in
mind when writing a case study. What was equally important was
to realize that these biases provided an interesting palimpsest on
Western perceptions of African in particular on whether or not there
was a valid 'West African civilization' (Wilkinson 1991a, p. 3,
refers to them as part of a group "of disputed level or autonomy, or
unprepossessing size"). Using Wilkinson's definition, there was
one: most civilizationists would dispute this. Most historians
would, in their turn, describe the Sudannic Empires as secondary
states. The precision in defining a world-system as an intersocietal
network made a stronger case for studying Ghana, Mali and
Songhai on their own merits, rather than eurocentric ones.
State Formation in the Western Sudan.
"By and large the Early Iron Age in sub-Saharan Africa was
characterized by the presence of small, relatively dispersed
settlements and not by the development of states, which first arose
in the Late Iron Age" (Mokhtar 1990: 296). The earliest date for
iron working in the Western Sudan was 80 A.D.: this was part of
an explosive cultural change that included the Bantu languages and
changes in agricultural techniques that swept the continent. One
could measure the relative speed of the diffusion of these innovations by evidence that ironwork was present in Eastern Africa by
200 A.D., and in Southern Africa by 400 A.D.
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Map One showed the estimated territories of the Ghana and Mali
empires (as well as Songhai, which will be discussed later in this
section) at the height of their authority, in 1000 and 1300 A.D.,
respectively. Ghana and Mali were distinguished by the relative
stability of their alliances, and in the basis for their centralized
control: that is, the trans-Saharan trade of gold for salt, the process
for which will be described in a subsequent section. Based on
Nehemia Levtzion's analysis, it was the trade itself that created the
need for "... a higher level of political organization, while the
emergence of extensive states accorded more security to trade"
(Levtzion. p. 10). While at first glance this seemed reminiscent of
the chicken and egg conundrum, this analysis could be extended to
incorporate the several elements of more stable polities. Both
Ghana and Mali used iron weapons and settled agriculture, but the
development of specific politics based on trade first required the
development of a trade product. In both politics this was gold, first
and foremost. 3
The development of Ghana has been disputed, and further
obscured by the particular biases of some of the Arab sources
(Almoravid, in particular). As archaeological work on Kumbi Saleh
continues, the dispute might be resolved. Based on the historical
argument, a somewhat sanitized version would be of two powerful
kingdoms existing in the second half of the ninth century with
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1993
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vassal chiefdoms that merged in response to pressure from the
Almoravid movement southward from Morocco. The Almoravids
were a group of Sanhaja Berbers, primarily Sufis, who had split off
from the northward expansion that ultimately resulted in the
conquest of Spain. This same pressure also accelerated contact with
Islam, although Ghana was not an Islamic state. There was an
extensive tax base among both the residents of the capital region of
Kumbi Saleh itself and of its vassal states: trade, tribute, artisanal
products (especially ironworks and weaving), as well as agriculture.
Most of the agricultural produce would have come from the forest
fringes and from settlements along the banks of the Niger. Ghana
also maintained a standing army, including cavalry units. The
ruling group fostered the gold trade, and encouraged the flow of
prestige goods back from the northern cities.
Mali, on the other hand, was largely a product of the success of
Ghana's trade and successful alliances between groups further south
and the Mali empire. Sundiata's reign began with both the
destruction of Ghana in 1240, and the Malinke chiefs swearing
fealty after the battle of Krina. This established what in European
terms would be the House of Keita: a patrilineal royal lineage.
Sundiata moved the polity's capital to Niani, which was considerably farther from the trade terminus of Timbuktu: the capital was
primarily a royal compound. His reign also began an alliance
system that still corresponds to family names in West Africa: an
example is Traor6 among the Bambara, which becomes Diop among
the Wolof. The polity spread for the next two centuries, finally
encompassing the area ... from the Lower Senegal and the Gambia
rivers in the west to the Songhay country on the Niger below Gao
in the east; from the Upper Niger in the south to the fringes of the
Sahara in the north" (Levtzion, p. 73). The Mali Empire occupied
the same function of trade route broker and supplier of gold that
Ghana had maintained, but extended the trade routes to incorporate
areas further south, and diversified the northern trade routes
through alliances with the Tuaregs and Berbers throughout the
Sahara.
The kings of Mali made pilgrimages to Egypt and Mecca, often
with extensive retinues (one particular king had an entourage of
80,000 men). This is perhaps the best indication of the massive
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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surpluses created by the gold trade. Timbuktu served as one of the
primary termini of the extensive trans-Saharan trade from the
thirteenth century,4 as indicated by caravans of more than 12,000
camels. This, by no means among the largest of the caravans
(some of which were reported to have more than 100,000 camels:
see the end notes for a more detailed discussion of the number
problem), which would have resulted in a massive flow of tradegoods and required corresponding logistical support for provisions
all along the trade routes.
A distinct caste structure was created below the royal kin
network separating the empire into smaller administrative divisions.
Some castes included artisans, serfs, domestic servants (drawn from
the available pool of slaves), and freemen. Merchants, soldiers and
the remainder of the proletariat were drawn from the freemen caste.
No money was minted, despite the extensive trade, and exchanges
were based upon specific weights of minerals (salt, gold, copper),
cowry shells or agricultural products (kola), although Egyptian
dinars were occasionally used. Bards5 were responsible for recordkeeping, and much of the history is therefore in a stylized oral
tradition. Writing was seldom used, but occasionally documents
were written by trading partners in Arabic. The standing army,
which included both infantry and cavalry units, numbered more
than 100,000 men at the height of the polity.
The Songhai Empire first appeared in the historical record
between 700 and 900 A.D., which was roughly contemporary with
the founding of the Ghanaian capital of Kumbi Saleh. Songhai was
primarily a riverain kingdom that extended along a 1,000 mile
stretch of the Niger. Three major groups comprised this earliest
phase of the kingdom: hunters (near Gao), fisherman (the Sorko)
and more settled horticulturalists. The capitol was initially at
Kukiya, but moved to Gao around the 11th century. Islam was
considered somewhat less 'mainstream' among the Songhai than in
the Mali Empire, but they were more Islamic than their predecessors in the Ghana Empire. In the context of the Empire, though, it
was possible to distinguish the less-Moslem Sonnis from the moreMoslem Askiyas. The administrative control at Gao consisted of
two separate towns: the royal compound, and the merchants'
compound. This type of separation, far from being specific to the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1993
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Songhai, has been found throughout Africa north of the forest. It
was, however, somewhat better documented among the Songhai
through recent archaeological evidence, particularly from Djenn6
(see Mcintosh & Mcintosh).
The Songhai came under the control of Mai during the rule of
Mansa Musa, shortly after his return from his much-celebrated
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324. This shift in power occurred after
approximately three centuries of increasingly fierce trade competition between the two kingdoms, and, to a lesser extent, with Ghana.
With the recapture of Timbuktu in 1468, Sonni Ali gradually
overthrew the Mali domination to re-establish Songhai as a separate
empire. Sonni Ali died in 1492, and was succeeded in a coup
d'etat by a former lieutenant who changed the royal title from Sonni
to Askia. Askia Mohammed I oversaw a Muslim revival, and
himself made a pilgrimage to Mecca (considerably less noteworthy
to local historians in Cairo than Mansa Musa's a century earlier)
consisting of an "escort of 500 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, and with
him he carried 300,000 pieces of gold" (Bovill 1968: 137). Map
One showed the extent of this empire, probably overrunning or
operating in parallel with the remnants of the Mali empire towards
the Atlantic coast, and to the east with the conquest of the Hausa
states. At one point, the Mali empire sought assistance from Portuguese traders along the coast for help in fending off further Songhai
aggression.
One key distinction between Ghana, Mali and Songhai was the
use of slaves. While slaves were used in all of these, and became
a major commodity, Songhai used them consistently, especially for
agricultural labor. "We even have an example, in the great slaveworked Songhai state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of
the emergence of a great landed estate in the bend of the Niger
whose growth, aided by the flooding of the river and the availability
of transportation, was solely to supply the needs of the administration and the army" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, pp. 118-9).
Askia Mohammed's reign ended in 1528 when a rebellion led by
three of his sons forced his abdication, but the Askias maintained
control over the kingdom until the Moroccan invasion, instigated by
the Sharif of Fez, Mulai Ahmed al Mansur, in 1591. Trade
continued, but the control of that trade shifted north, to Fez. The
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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basic administrative units also continued, although there was
increased fragmentation as the more peripheral areas reasserted
themselves. In particular, the centers of Islamic learning along the
Niger continued and flourished.
The Process of Trade.
For Ghana, Mali and Songhai, the control of trade routes was the
primary source of wealth. This control was more important than
the actual effort involved in mining the metal, although the kings of
all three empires exercised control over the distribution of gold.
Four factors combined to make this trade possible: the camel,
Berber tribesmen, Islam, and strong empires (Levtzion, p. 124). In
other words, camels provided the transportation, Berber tribesmen
ensured the source of provisions, Islam provided some internal
cohesion as well as an ideological link with other people in the
Sahel, and the imperial structure supplied the politico-military
organization that mandated and safeguarded the available resources.
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Trade Routes & Networks. Systematic trade began in the eighth
century, largely in response to the demand from the cities of Fez,
Tripoli, and, most especially, Cairo, for the raw material for
minting coins, as well as for jewelry and other luxury items. The
gold supply was readily available, and its distribution northward
could be controlled by a single authority.
Map Two showed the pattern of the trade routes across the Sahel
that penetrated south into the forest zone. These trade routes
covered all of the Sahara, in a more extensive network than the
modern trade routes, and included both bulk goods and prestige
items. While not all of the trade routes were equally utilized
between the ninth to the sixteenth centuries, the route from Tripoli
through Ghadames southwest to Awdaghost has the earliest mention
in the literature. The routes from Morocco via Taghaza and
Taodeni to Timbuktu were favored during the Mali Empire, while
the western route through the Fezzan via Bilma, Agades and Gao
was heavily used during the Songhai Empire.
Camel caravans from Mogador to Timbuktu, for example, could
take up to 70 days, and generally started out to Timbuktu in
September/October, and returned in the spring (Schroeter, pp. 93105). Moroccan merchants jointly financed one very large caravan
annually, often with as many as 10,000 camels.6 The process of
trade along the route was just as important as the goods which
arrived in either terminus, as the trip required purchasing foodstuffs
and water along the route, and, indeed, most of the profit in
Timbuktu would come from the sale of salt purchased along the
caravan route. The sequence began in Mogador with only about a
fifth of the camels loaded with trade goods. The merchants would
load another fifth to a third of the unladen camels in the caravan
with salt obtained in exchange for trading, provisions and safe
passage in cities along the route, such as Taghaza or Taodeni. Then
the caravan would continue to Timbuktu. The goods that had been
loaded in Mogador, along with the salt from Taghaza, and often
some of the camels themselves would be traded over several
months, in exchange for goods to be carried back to Mogador.
The Berber territories of Fezzan, Hoggar and Tuat were
important intermediaries both for the general logistics of the trade
routes and the basic dynamics of the trade itself. With their date
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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palm oases needed for reprovisioning the caravans, these areas were
the medieval Saharan equivalent of truck stops. They served as a
long semi-permeable membrane between the northern trade system
of the Mediterranean littoral and the more southern trade system of
the Sahel and its southern forest zone.
Of equal importance for the flow of goods was the water
transport along the Niger. This had been the heart of the Songhai
territory, and provided a quick method of transportation. Goods
would be offloaded from camels onto either donkeys or boats at
Timbuktu where they traversed a 500 mile corridor, either upstream
between Timbuktu and Djenn6 or downstream between Timbuktu
and Gao.
One factor to consider in terms of the volume of trade was the
relative transportation costs: it is likely that the long-distance costs
of the trans-Saharan trade were equivalent to more 'efficient'
methods of transportation, given that water transport along the coast
of West Africa was not possible until the late fifteenth century. The
high labor costs of overland transport were balanced out by the
relatively high return on investment. The absence of wheeled
transport7 limited the volume possible, but the relatively small
population in the Sudannic empires only produced a fairly small
demand for goods. The exchange of gold for salt looked unequal
given the place of gold on the prestige goods network and salt on
the bulk goods network, but this was only until one took into
account two factors. First, this was not an equal exchange of gold
for salt (i.e., a pound of gold for a pound of salt: the relative
values were negotiated and then enforced at both ends of the trade
route). There were also other items included on the prestige goods
network going north, such as ivory, ostrich feathers and slaves in
exchange for the southward traffic in salt, horses, cloth, and art.
Second, salt was an item on (eurocentric) bulk goods networks
because it had historically been readily available: from evaporation
of sea water, or mineral deposits. Salt was a rare commodity in
West Africa, but one vital to human survival.
Transport. Camels had been known throughout the Sahara for more
than five hundred years when they became the principle pack
animal for the long distance trade. Many of the Berber tribes raised
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1993
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racing camels (meharis), which were longer-legged and better
adapted to desert conditions than other types of dromedaries. These
animals were used in preference to oxen for transporting goods, as
well as for cavalry units. They were generally saddled in front of
the hump in the Western Sudan. Camels had distinct advantages in
the Sahara over other types of pack animals. Probably the key was
their ability to go up to twenty days without water, but crucial was
the amount of weight a camel could carry, the distance it could
travel daily, its catholic eating habits and general low maintenance
requirements.
Camels usually carried about 300 pounds over long distances,
but were capable of carrying 500-600 pounds for shorter periods.
The average distance a loaded camel could travel comfortably was
about twenty miles a day. Of perhaps equal importance, from a
structural standpoint, was the camel's ability to travel over rough
terrain. Roads, and, as a result, wheeled vehicles, were largely
absent from the trade routes throughout the Sahel. The one major
drawback to the camel was their susceptibility to sleeping sickness.
This weakness limited their use below the Niger and left their
breeding to the Berbers.
Means of Exchange. Most of the gold in West Africa was mined
in shallow placer mines, although some was panned and there were
a few deeper shafts (about 150 feet). Map One showed some of the
areas where ore has been found. Most of the production was done
by small independent groups.8 There was no indication that the
Sudannic Empires exercised any type of local authority over the
gold deposits, as the focus for control was primarily over its
distribution. Only gold dust could be traded without royal approval
and nuggets were a royal monopoly, in much the same way that
sugar is today in Morocco. The actual quantity is in some dispute,
but "output is commonly assumed to have reached a peak in the late
Middle Ages, when West Africa became the principal source of
supply for Western Europe" (Hopkins, p. 46). Estimates of the
actual quantities of gold exported range widely. Anthony Hopkins
conservatively estimated the gold exported to be 3.5 tons annually,
which would equal the total output of French West Africa in 1937.
The modern output might actually be close to the medieval reality
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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through two countervailing tendencies. The first tendency involved
the fluctuations in the value of gold (as the source of monetary
value), which actively encouraged/discouraged production simultaneously. Overproduction could drive down the exchange value, but
production, and finding new sources of both production and new
groups with which to trade, have been consistently encouraging
factors for exploration and exploitation since gold first achieved its
status value, and clearly continued through the present day. The
second tendency concerned the change in the use value of gold as
a tool for supporting and reinforcing state formation. Specifically,
the modern political authority over the mineral was much more
diffuse than historically, as there were more states in the modern
Sahel. This also simultaneously encouraged/discouraged production
through regional competition and regulation, as the variety of
authorities tried to keep production down so that value would
remain high. In addition, the modern locus of production was
much more specific, as many of the historical gold sources have
been significantly reduced or exhausted.
The impact of West African gold was significant, however, which
indicated that the quantities were also significant. Mansa Musa's
pilgrimage to Mecca illustrated the effects of this abundance, as the
passage of his retinue through Cairo actually destablized the local
economy with the influx of so much additional gold, devaluing the
local system of weights and values. Several contemporary accounts
related how his entourage paid five dinars for items selling for one.
Clearly, bargaining in Cairo has not changed significantly for
tourists in the past half millennium.
The Process of Islam.
Islam spread and established communities along the Mediterranean during the 7th century. By 7734, the Arabic author al-Fazari
was writing about Bilad al-Sudan (the land of black men), and
references began to appear in the literature with increasing frequency. The connection between Islam and trade was very evident
along the trans—Saharan trade routes: along the southern fringe of
these routes, the Hausa word for Moslem was the same as the one
for trader. By the ninth century, regular trans-Saharan trade had
been established, which continued uninterrupted through the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1993
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nineteenth century. Travel accounts written by Ibn Battuta, Leo
Africanus, and Ibn Khaldun alluded to the wealth of the empires
and to the creation of Islamic centers of learning, especially at
Timbuktu.
The Berbers were key for both the use of camels and the dissemination of Islam. This group of people included the Tuareg, as well
as the Moroccan dynasties, with the result that there was an
especially heterogeneous range of economic and religious social
organizations. This heterogeneity both illustrated and complicated
the concurrent impacts of trade and Islam.
North African Islam was, in itself, a competing system of
influences. There were three types of Islam that exerted influences
at various times along the trans-Saharan routes: Sunnism, Suflsm,
and a popularized form of Suflsm. The seventh and eighth
centuries were distinguished primarily by a westward movement
along the Mediterranean littoral, with such success that by 740
A.D. most Berbers had embraced Islam. Most were attracted to the
Kharijiyya sect of Suflsm, which was a somewhat more puritanical
interpretation of the Shari'ya.
The earliest influences on the Sudan were filtered through the
Berber groups in the desert, and especially the Sanhaja Berbers
towards the west. This group tended towards a somewhat more
intellectual form of Sufism, at the same time extending their
influence "to conquer the trade route cities of Sijilmasa and
Awdaghust." (Hiskett, p. 7) The Almoravids were part of this
group of Berbers and extended the range of Islam both north into
Spain and southward, past Marrakesh, into the desert by the early
twelfth century.
The penetration of many different social levels by Islam meant
that the strong Sufi mystic tendencies were often emphasized rather
than the more 'intellectual' aspects; a phenomenon comparable to
the spread of Christianity several hundred years earlier. This more
popular form of Sufism was part of the Almohad and Marinid
periods in Morocco, and shaped their contacts with the Western
Sudan from around 1274-1465 (Hiskett, p. 8).
Two traditions - the intellectual man (awliya) and the wandering
preachers (murabitunu(l) - combined during the Marinid period to
form the marabouts who became instrumental in both the penetrahttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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tion and politicization of Islam in the following centuries. The
more popular Sufism relied on its emotional experience, together
with a use of Koranic charms: the physical connections familiar to
their animist contacts, such as charms and place spirits. The
politicization of the brotherhoods (turuq) in North Africa itself grew
as well in response to increasing pressure from Spanish and
P o r t u g u e s e attacks t h r o u g h o u t t h e fifteenth c e n t u r y .

Islam in Egypt followed a different path, remaining primarily
Sunni. and exercised in their turn, considerable influence over the
most extreme Berber groups, especially the Tuareg.
It was the more popular Sufism and Sunnism that had the most
impact on the Western Sudan. The city of Timbuktu was an
important center for the 'ulamd (the Moslem judicial court and
university): during the fourteenth century, this was one of Ibn
Battuta's stops in the Mali Empire. By the time of Sonni 'Ali in the
second half of the fifteenth century, the influence of the 'ulamd was
sufficient to obstruct his empire- building. It was sufficient to
foster the rival claims of Askiya Mohammed within fifty years, on
the grounds that Sonni 'Ali was more of an animist than a good
Muslim.
The connections between the political impact of Islam and its
economic role were also interesting, especially as they demonstrated
that this was scarcely a unilateral transfer of ideology. All of the
groups in the Western Sudan shaped Islam to a degree.
Successful integration required a formal moral code to sanction and
control commercial relationships. The 'blueprint' for the formation
of a moral community of businessmen was provided by Islam, which
was closely associated with long distance trade in West Africa from
the eighth century onwards. Islam helped maintain the identity of
members of a network or firms who were scattered over a wide area,
and often in foreign countries; it enabled traders to recognize, and
hence to deal readily with, each other; and it provided moral and
ritual sanctions to enforce a code of conduct which made trust and
credit possible. (Hopkins, p. 64)

Islam clearly played a strategic role for the local rulers. It gave
them access to markets, technologies and a convenient ideology, but
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was also manipulated locally. While the jihads of the early
nineteenth century provide the most vivid illustration of this
manipulation, it is likely that this would also have occurred in the
earlier phases of Islam's contact with the Western Sudan.
This has been a somewhat schematic overview of the different
variations of Islam: the picture was much more complex in terms
of the relations between and among the Berbers themselves, and
their shifting relations with the urban centers.
Conclusions
Of the two theoretical perspectives, Chase-Dunn's nestedness of
complex intersocietal networks provided a better framework for
explaining the socioeconomic aspects of both trade and Islam.
Wilkinson's definition could be incorporated within this framework,
and indeed served as a way to mark the boundaries of a particular
state's second network, as it was especially useful given the
incorporative and expansionary tendency of the three succeeding
West African empires. The key similarity in their definitions of
world-systems as intersocietal networks made it possible to include
the West African case, as opposed to a more culturally homogenous
definition of civilization. Ghana, Mali and Songhai all met the
criteria for cores: standing armies, bureaucracies, and urban centers
fed by peripheral rural areas. The shift in control over the trade
routes showed a progressive centrifugal movement over more and
more territory. At the same time, the locus of control moved
eastward, away from the sources of gold and closer to a more
central position geographically, controlling more trade routes. The
relations of the Sudannic Empires with Fez and Cairo were those of
cores within the third interaction network of prestige goods.
Three major conclusions were drawn from this study, concerning
the role of the trade routes in the world-system, the function of gold
as part of, yet distinct from, the prestige goods interaction network,
and the role of ideology as a possibly more extensive interaction
network than the previously identified ones.
While trade and Islam were both clearly spread by core states,
the routes themselves were the product of neither a centralized
hierarchy, nor a uniquely natural phenomenon. No single centralized hierarchy controlled all of the routes, or even any one route
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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for its entire length, as was the case for some of the European
powers that exercised a monopoly over that route. Nor was the
process of trade dependent on control over some specific natural
phenomenon, like a seaworthy harbor. The process of control over
the trade routes was one of shifting alliances regarding both the
trade goods and the religious affiliations of the groups, and the
multiplicity of the routes provided tremendous flexibility in
core/semiperiphery relations.
Prestige goods, which comprised Chase-Dunn's third network,
widened the system, but still only partially captured the impact of
the trade in gold, as opposed to other prestige goods. The use of
gold pervaded all social levels and was not limited to the elite, even
though its use changed, and its quantity both created and destroyed
hierarchical control. Gold was the necessary component in state
formation, in permitting the rise of specific castes dedicated to
particular tasks, and served as the primary unit of value for both the
Sudannic Empires and their trading partners to the north. At all
levels of society, gold was an integral part of marriage negotiations,
and its display as jewelry was not simply a matter of individual
taste, but rather family wealth and status. While control over
production was a source of competition among the West African
states, control over its exchange north and the distribution of salt
southward was the final measure of achieving core status. At the
same time, no single state ever achieved monopoly control over all
of the trade in the Sahara: there were too many routes, and too
many different sources for commodities. The Sudannic Empires
controlled the southern termini of the trade system, and the goods
that could be traded there. This was the primary source of their
wealth.
Islam also pervaded all social levels, ranging from a more
populist Sufism, demonstrated by charms, through the more
intellectual Sufism, and to the most orthodox Sunnism. The extent
of Islam's influence range became key at the second interaction
network of politico-military control, and frequently became an
instrument for one core to expand its range. This particular
ideology extended throughout the prestige goods network, but not
always as the major ideological influence. It also went considerably
beyond the prestige system network in the Sahel and North Africa,
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interacting with many other world-systems. While first contact
might have been through the prestige system, it was often incorporated into the second interaction network through a process of
comparative advantage with the local elites. The alliance between
one ethnicity and control over trade associated with trade diasporas
was quickly replaced in the Sudannic Empires by the penetration of
Islam, which made it no longer necessary to limit trade to one
particular group.
This comparative advantage was due to the types of alliances
Moslem peoples might be more likely to make with each other,
rather than with the local animist peoples in terms of trading
influence and weaponry. Among the Songhai, certainly the most
obvious case was Askia Mohammed's use of Islam as both religion
and political ideology contributed to the overthrow of the Sonnis:
he could use the influence of the 'ulama to giving their support to
his revolt, support that took the tangible form of proscribing
assistance on the part of other Moslems to the Sonni dynasty. The
impact of Islam on the first interaction network varied much more
widely: the bulk goods system was much more resistant to its
influence, and it was here that the older ideologies exerted the most
control, especially with regards to reshaping Islam within local
norms.
While Islam and trade are indeed closely linked, it was clear that
what they shared in this case was the process of dissemination. The
contact Islam had with, for example, East Africa, was basically
limited to the coastal settlements, despite an extensive trade network
with the interior. If the 'push' factors for Islam were relatively
similar in both cases, such as expanding trade and spreading the
faith, it seemed that the 'pull' factors of the local groups in East
Africa and elsewhere varied more significantly. Was this due to the
presence of strong states in the Western Sudan alone? When and
how do ideologies penetrate different interaction networks, and
what factors condition their acceptance or rejection by different
levels of society?
The challenge now will be to define the ideological network,
which appears to function differently from the other networks.
There may be a fourth interaction network, which intersects with
the other three networks, but does not exercise the same
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/6
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incorporative structure as the first three, further complicating
Figure One by making it three-dimensional.
Endnotes
1. Another important difference between Chase-Dunn and Hall and
Wilkinson was the mode of production, the underlying systemic
logic in a world-system. Chase-Dunn and Hall's emphasis on trade
and their inclusion of pre-state world-systems made this crucial: this
distinction is not addressed here because it formed the basis for a
longer analysis elsewhere.
2. The term 'religion' is often equated with 'ideology' in sociology, with ideology being the considered the more generic term,
incorporating both its moral and political natures. Ideology is used
throughout this paper to reinforce the political use of Islam within
the Sudannic Empires.
3. This is not to say that other products were not an integral part
of the trade networks. Slaves, kola nuts, ostrich feathers, among
others, all went northward. But gold was the export that enabled
both state formation and provided the most stable source of revenue
for the Sudannic Empires. Control over this resource, as opposed
to letting others gain control over it, was the pre-eminent reason for
the formation of the Ghana Empire. This control was maintained
by both the Mali and Songhai Empires until the cost of achieving
control over the resource was less than the cost of trading for it:
that economic equation, with the addition of the superior firepower
of the Moroccan invasion, signalled the end of West African control
over the resource.
4. Timbuktu served as a terminus for the trans-Saharan trade until
the late nineteenth century, although the volume of trade had
considerably diminished with the advent of water transport along
the coast and thence upriver, which made the overland route less
attractive. There are still caravans that go from Mogador to
Agadez (in Niger), for example, as well as other locations. Many
still transport salt to markets in the Sahel.
5. Griot is the French version of a Portuguese term, criollo, that
the early explorers used for bard. I have avoided it here, as the
definition of bard more accurately conveys its function, and reduces
the number of language filters. Bards were not simply court poets,
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recounting the praises of the current and previous rulers, but were
also highly trained in memorization and used because of this skill
(in place of writing) in negotiating and recording trade agreements.
6. This type of caravan continued throughout most of the nineteenth century. But the number of camels posed its own problem:
a caravan of 10,000 camels lined up in a single file would stretch
for more than thirteen miles, and security would have been
impossible. Even bunching the camels closer together does not
remove the question of adequate fodder, as well as water and
provisions for the humans they carried. Two possible explanations
are that first, the numbers related to a specific caravan were
sometimes inflated, to glorify a particular reign, for example, and
second, the departure dates were staggered over several weeks.
The second alternative would imply a great deal of cooperation
among the merchants.
7. There were no paved roads, and only infrequently marked
paths, across the Sahara. Wheeled transport required oxen, mules
or horse to pull: these animals could not survive on the available
water and forage in the desert over a long distance. Camels,
because of their anatomy and disposition, do not perform well
harnessed to carts. The first motorized caravan across the Sahara
was a French expedition in the late 1920s, and there are now both
roads and regular truck runs to Mali and Niger from North Africa.
8. This is still the major mining technique for gold in West Africa,
where significant deposits are found near the surface. The deposits
are found in soft material, rather than in the quartz veins of the
American West. As these are exploited, more complex engineering
techniques may be used for deposits deeper in the earth. But
panning for gold in the Niger and its smaller tributaries is one of
the major sources of income for women in Mali, especially in the
western cercles (administrative regions) of the country.
—The Johns Hopkins University
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